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T his article examines the
private placement market for
corporate debt and the recent
credit crunch in that market.
This article examines the private place-
ment market for corporate debt and the recent
credit crunch in that market. Neither the private
placement market nor the crunch have received
much attention from economists, but both are
important. The private market is a significant
source of funding for medium-sized companies.
Starting in the early 1990s, the credit crunch 
in the private market cut off most below-
investment-grade companies from a traditional
source of long-term funds; it is an example of 
a mechanism of credit market disruption that
economists have yet to focus on.
The article first examines the structure of
the private placement market, including con-
tract terms and who the typical borrowers and
lenders are. The private placement market is 
an information-intensive market that shares
much with the more familiar bank loan market:
borrowers and lenders typically negotiate lend-
ing terms, lenders evaluate and monitor bor-
rowers’ credit risk, covenants are used to
control risk, and borrowers generally lack
access to public debt markets because they are
too information-problematic for public market
investors to evaluate.
1 As in the bank loan mar-
ket, a key activity of lenders in the private
placement market is the gathering and produc-
tion of information about borrowers’ credit
quality. However, there are also significant 
differences from the bank loan market: debt
instruments in the private placement market are
securities rather than loans, maturities of private
placements are much longer than those of bank
loans, interest rates are fixed rather than float-
ing, and the principal financial intermediaries
investing in private placements are life insur-
ance companies, not banks.
The article also analyzes the credit crunch
that occurred in the below-investment-grade
sector of the private placement market in the
early 1990s. Credit crunches have long been 
an interesting and controversial topic, because
producing compelling evidence that a crunch
occurred is often difficult and because econo-
mists have proposed a variety of mechanisms
that can cause crunches. For the recent credit
crunch in the private placement market, rela-
tively extensive evidence is available. In addi-
tion, the causes of the crunch appear to differ
from the standard ones proposed in the aca-
demic literature. Another interesting aspect of
this credit crunch is that it apparently continues
to this day, long after its initial causes—financial
problems at life insurance companies and a 
policyholder focus on the industry’s below-
investment-grade bond investments—appear toFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       13 ECONOMIC REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1997
have waned. I examine some possible reasons
for the persistence of the crunch.
The structure of the 
private placement market
A private placement is a debt security
issued by a firm that is exempt from registration
with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). By law, private placements must be sold
only to a limited number of sophisticated inves-
tors (typically life insurance companies). Both
initial offerings and secondary transactions of
private placements are restricted in this fashion.
This article focuses on the traditional 
market for privately placed debt, which is dis-
tinct from the so-called Rule 144A market for
private debt securities. Rule 144A, adopted by
the SEC in 1990, provides more formal exemp-
tion from registration for secondary transactions
in private placements. It has essentially evolved
into a quasi-public market that is quite distinct
from the traditional market. Most borrowers in
the Rule 144A market are less information-
problematic than traditional market borrowers.
Lenders include traditional public bond buyers
such as mutual funds and pension funds as well
as life insurers; securities very often have regis-
tration rights attached to them and are formally
underwritten (as in the public bond market), as
opposed to sold on a “best-efforts” basis by
agents (as in the traditional private market). There
is generally substantially less gathering and 
production of information on borrower credit
quality by lenders in the Rule 144A market.
2
Private placements are a significant source
of funds for U.S. corporations. During 1994–96,
gross issuance of private placements by non-
financial corporations was almost 40 percent of
that in the public market. For a few years in 
the late 1980s, private issuance actually ex-
ceeded public issuance (Figure 1). The surge 
in public issuance in periods of falling in-
terest rates (for example, in the mid-1980s 
and early 1990s)—which primarily reflects 
refinancing activity—has not been matched by
private issuance because most private bonds
carry punitive prepayment penalties, making
refinancing unattractive.
3 The market size in
terms of the outstanding stock of bonds also
suggests that the private placement market is 
an important one. At year-end 1996, the non-
financial corporate sector had about $450 bil-
lion of private placements outstanding, roughly
70 percent of the amount of bank loans ($640
billion) and almost 50 percent of the amount of
public bonds ($950 billion) outstanding.
4
Table 1 sets out some of the differences in
contract terms, borrowers, and lenders between
the private placement market and the two other
major debt markets—the public bond and bank
loan markets. Many of these differences are
consistent with the notion that, for many firms,
these are very distinct markets to which there is
a hierarchical pattern of access. In other words,
there are many firms that are too information-
problematic to borrow in the public bond 
market—they need to take advantage of the
intensive due diligence and monitoring in the
private placement or bank loan market. Of
these, the most information-problematic firms
are probably restricted to the bank loan market,
where the most intensive monitoring takes
place. Thus, the private placement market is 
a much more information-intensive market 
than the public bond market but probably
somewhat less information-intensive than the
bank loan market.
Contract terms and borrowers. Contract
terms differ substantially across the three debt
markets listed in Table 1. On average, private
placements are larger than bank loans and
smaller than public bonds. Carey et al. (1993)
report that in 1989 roughly 80 percent of all 
private placement issues ranged from $10 mil-
lion to $100 million. In contrast, more than 80
percent of all bank loans ranged from $10,000
to $1 million, while more than 80 percent of 
all public bonds issued ranged from $100 mil-
lion to $500 million.
Maturities of private placements are gener-
ally longer than those of bank loans but shorter
than those of public bonds. Bank loans have
relatively short maturities—Carey et al. (1993)
Figure 1
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report that in 1989 roughly 80 percent of all
bank loans were for less than one year. Private
placements are generally of intermediate to 
long term (between seven and fifteen years)
maturity—more than half of all private place-
ments issued in 1989 were within this maturity
range. Finally, public bonds are typically long
term—roughly 70 percent of all public bonds
issued in 1989 were longer than ten years in
maturity.
The use of covenants also varies substan-
tially across these three debt markets. Cove-
nants are a mechanism lenders use to control
risk. Affirmative covenants require a borrower
to meet certain standards of behavior. They
include requirements that the firm stay in the
same business and meet its legal and contrac-
tual obligations. Affirmative covenants are 
common in all three debt markets. Negative
covenants restrain the borrower from taking
actions that would be detrimental to debt-
holders. They include restrictions on capital
expenditures, the sale of assets, dividends,
merger and acquisition activity, and the amount
of additional debt the firm can take on. Finally,
financial covenants restrict measurable financial
variables and can stipulate minimums to be
maintained on capital, interest coverage, and
the ratio of assets to liabilities.
The frequency and tightness of negative
and financial covenants in both the bank loan
and private placement markets vary with the
degree of information problems the firm poses
to outsiders and its observable credit risk.
“Tightness” refers to the likelihood that a par-
ticular covenant will be binding in the future.
Both private placements and bank loans for
more information-problematic firms often con-
tain many financial and negative covenants,
whereas covenants are fewer and looser (that 
is, with minimum values further from current
values) in both markets for firms that pose
fewer information problems. In particular, how-
ever, bank loan agreements appear to contain
more and tighter covenants than private bonds,
even for borrowers with the same characteris-
tics, while negative or financial covenants in
public bonds are extremely rare.
5
Since covenants limit a borrowing firm’s
financial and operational flexibility, there are
usually either implicit or explicit provisions for
contract renegotiation, whereby the lender can
examine requests for a waiver or relaxation of 
a covenant. Lenders that offer such provisions
must of course have the ability to monitor and
evaluate borrowers and the effect on their 
creditworthiness of relaxing particular provi-
sions in the debt contract. The more frequent
and tighter covenants in bank loans mean that
covenant renegotiation is most frequent in this
market. However, renegotiation is also quite 
frequent in private placements, while renegotia-
tion is extremely rare in public bonds.
6
These cross-market differences in contract
terms are usually consistent with the notion that
firms posing the greatest information problems
for outside investors are generally restricted to
the bank loan market, firms with less severe
information problems have access to the private
placement market, and only those large public
firms with the fewest information problems can




Characteristic Bank loan Private placement Public bond
Contract terms
Average loan size Small Medium Large
Average maturity Short Long Longest
Interest rate Floating Fixed Fixed
Covenants Many, tight Fewer, looser Fewest, loosest
Covenant renegotiation Frequent Less frequent Rare
Collateral Frequent Less frequent Rare
Liquidity of instrument Low Low High
Borrowers
Average borrower size Small Medium to large Large
Severity of information
problems posed by borrowers High Moderate Low
Lenders
Lenders Intermediaries Intermediaries Varies
Principal lender Banks Life insurers Various
Lender monitoring Intense Significant MinimalFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       15 ECONOMIC REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1997
different debt markets specialize in providing
financing to borrowers that differ in the degree
of information problems they pose to investors.
Cross-market patterns of issue size are
consistent with this notion. The information
problems borrowers pose to lenders span a
spectrum. Firm size is an important determinant
of where on this spectrum a firm is because size
is correlated with age and the length of a track
record. Size is also related to the number of
externally visible contracts the firm has, as 
well as to the firm’s stake in its own reputation.
Of course, borrower size is also highly corre-
lated with issue size. Thus, smaller borrowers,
which make smaller issues, are often less well-
established and less well-known firms; conse-
quently, they require more due diligence and
loan monitoring by the lender. In fact, as Carey
et al. (1993) show, borrowers in the public 
market are substantially larger than borrowers in
the private placement market, which are in turn
substantially larger than firms that are restricted
to the bank loan market for raising funds.
Cross-market patterns of covenants are
also consistent with the notion that each debt
market serves borrowers differing in the degree
of information problems posed to lenders.
Information-problematic firms are subject to
covenants that limit their risk-taking ability. But
in order not to restrict the firms’ activities too
much, there must be room for renegotiating
them at appropriate times. This can only occur
in markets where the lenders are willing and
able to renegotiate. Information-problematic firms
cannot borrow in the public market because
covenants are not effective there, since public
lenders have little capacity for monitoring.
Differences in maturity between the bank
loan and private placement markets appear
related to the liability structures of the differing
lenders in each market. Banks have short-
term, floating-rate liabilities, which they can
match with short-term, floating-rate loans.
Conversely, life insurance companies have pri-
marily long-term, fixed-rate liabilities, which are
conveniently matched by private placement
investments. Although banks could in principle
make long-term, fixed-rate loans and execute
swaps to obtain payment streams matching 
their floating-rate liabilities, they seldom do so.
Perhaps this is because the transactions costs of
such swaps are too high. An alternative expla-
nation, however, is that the different markets
serve borrowers that differ in terms of the credit
evaluation and monitoring they require, and
that in equilibrium the different credit analysis
requirements require different maturities to be
most efficient. For example, the tighter the
covenants used to control borrower behavior,
the shorter the maturity of the contract needs to
be to provide flexibility for the borrower.
Lenders. Market participants estimate that
life insurers purchase between 50 and 80 per-
cent of all private placement issues. Carey et al.
(1993) provide evidence supporting estimates at
the high end of this range. Foreign and com-
mercial banks, pension funds, finance compa-
nies, investment banks, and thrifts are all minor
players in the market. As mentioned above, one
reason for life insurers’ dominance is that they
are uniquely suited to investing in private place-
ments because the fixed-rate, intermediate- to
long-term nature of the security can be easily
matched with their liabilities. At year-end 1995,
life insurers held about $250 billion of private
placements, representing about 14 percent of
their general account assets and 37 percent of
their total corporate bond holdings.
7 Within the
life insurance industry, private placement lend-
ing is concentrated in the hands of the largest
twenty insurers, which hold about 70 percent 
of total life insurance industry private place-
ment holdings.
8
Life insurance companies are information-
intensive lenders—that is, they conduct both
substantial due diligence on the borrower
before making the loan and continuous moni-
toring after the loan is made. Thus they have
large investments in risk-control technologies.
Most insurers have traditionally had large staffs
of credit analysts, who evaluate the credit 
quality of potential borrowers and monitor the
health of firms to which credit has been
extended. Most review each private placement
in their portfolio quarterly and conduct a more
formal semiannual or annual review. Violations
of or requests for renegotiation of covenants
generate further reviews. The costs of risk-
control operations are covered by the higher
risk-adjusted yield of private placements relative
to public bonds, which require little or no 
active monitoring by securityholders.
Their large investments in credit evalua-
tion and monitoring have traditionally led most
life insurance companies to focus on more com-
plex and lower rated credits, and the industry’s
expertise in investing in such bonds has largely
been built up over the postwar period. For
example, Shapiro (1977) notes that between
1960 and 1975, the share of insurers’ annual
commitments to private placements devoted to
bonds rated Baa or below was roughly 60 per-
cent, with the share going to below-investment-
grade private bonds (those rated Ba or below)16
at roughly 20 percent. As late as 1990, insurers
were still following this investment pattern: at
year-end 1990 the life insurance industry held
56.8 percent of its total private bond holdings in
bonds rated Baa or below, with 19.8 percent 
in bonds rated below investment grade. As
described in the next section, however, in 1990
and 1991 the share of insurance industry com-
mitments to below-investment-grade bonds was
abruptly and sharply lowered, a phenomenon 
I call a “credit crunch.”
The credit crunch
The private placement market is funda-
mentally an information-intensive market, with
life insurance companies as the principal inter-
mediaries. One feature all intermediaries share
is their vulnerability to withdrawals of funds by
liabilityholders, or runs, with consequent dis-
ruptions in the markets in which they lend. This
section investigates an example of a disruption
in the private placement market.
9
Starting in mid-1990, issuers of below-
investment-grade securities encountered a sharp
contraction in the availability of credit in the 
private placement market. A coincident sharp
rise in interest rate spreads on these securities
suggests that the reduction in supply was larger
than any decline in credit demand associated
with the weak economy in that period. The 
primary mechanism for this credit crunch
appears to have been asset-quality problems at
life insurance companies in 1990 and 1991,
which focused regulatory, stock market, media,
and policyholder attention on the financial sol-
vency of life insurers. For a variety of reasons,
such attention focused on the share of below-
investment-grade bonds on life insurance com-
pany balance sheets: insurers with a high share
were penalized by lower stock prices, unfavor-
able media reports, and slower sales growth of
life insurance products. Insurers thus began
competing with each other not just on price 
but also on the basis of the share of below-
investment-grade bonds on their books. As a
result, insurers stopped buying below-invest-
ment-grade bonds, precipitating a crunch in the
private market for these bonds where they had
previously been the dominant investors.
10 In
other words, there was a flight to quality by life
insurance companies.
This flight-to-quality mechanism differs
somewhat from those proposed by economists.
It is most closely related to the class of models
that focuses on runs caused by liabilityholder
concerns about financial intermediaries’ solvency.
However, unlike in these models, no actual runs
occurred to trigger a flight to quality by an
insurance company.
One surprising aspect of the credit crunch
is its persistence. Even today, life insurers
appear to be infrequent purchasers of below-
investment-grade private bonds, while gross
issuance remains low and spreads remain high,
despite the fact that solvency concerns about
life insurance companies and concerns about
below-investment-grade bonds have largely
been put to rest. I investigate reasons for the
persistence of the crunch.
Definition of a credit crunch. Many defini-
tions of the term credit crunch appear in the 
literature (see Clair and Tucker 1993 for a
review). My definition is that, for a given price
of credit, lenders substantially reduce the 
volume of credit provided to a group of bor-
rowers whose risk is essentially unchanged.
That is, a credit crunch is caused by a reduction
in lenders’ willingness to make risky invest-
ments—in terms of a supply-and-demand 
diagram, a credit crunch is a substantial left-
ward shift in the supply of credit, when the shift
is not principally due to an increase in the risk-
iness of borrowers.
11
Note that a supply shift alone does not
imply a credit crunch, as the supply curve may
shift due to an increase in the riskiness of bor-
Table 2
Gross Issuance of Private Placements by Nonfinancial Corporations, 1989–95
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Total issuance $54.7 $49.9 $42.1 $29.5 $52.0 $31.0 $41.0
(in billions)
Below investment
grade (BIG) $6.6 $8.1 $3.8 $3.2 $3.0 $2.0 $1.0
(in billions)
BIG as percentage
of total 12.1 16.2 8.9 10.8 5.8 6.4 2.4
NOTE: Excludes restructuring-related issues in excess of $250 million, issues to finance employee stock ownership plans,
and Rule 144A issues.
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rowers. Thus my credit crunch definition does
not encompass the reduction in supply that is 
a normal response by lenders in a recession. In
a recession, borrower riskiness normally in-
creases, and lenders demand compensation
either in higher interest rates or in tighter non-
price credit terms. Although borrowers might
characterize such a reduction in credit as a
credit crunch, such a characterization would be
incorrect because the decrease in credit is a 
normal response of lenders to changing condi-
tions. Cantor and Wenninger (1993) refer to this
situation as a “credit slowdown.”
My definition of a credit crunch differs
from some, notably that of Owens and Schreft
(1992), in that it does not require that the credit
reduction be accomplished by nonprice ration-
ing. The reduction may be effected entirely by
an increase in the relative price of credit, as
would normally occur in response to a leftward
shift in the supply curve, or by some combina-
tion of price increase and nonprice rationing.
Evidence for a credit crunch. Events in the
below-investment-grade sector of the private
placement market in the early 1990s qualify as 
a credit crunch because gross issuance of
below-investment-grade private placements
declined substantially and spreads on such 
debt increased sharply, whereas spreads on
investment-grade private debt declined. A gen-
eral increase in the riskiness of borrowers due
to the 1990–91 recession cannot account for
these phenomena.
12
Data from three sources confirm a reduc-
tion in issuance of below-investment-grade pri-
vate placements. First, gross issuance by below-
investment-grade nonfinancial corporations fell
by more than 50 percent in 1991, a much
steeper drop than issuance by investment-grade
corporations (Table 2).
13 As a share of gross
offerings, below-investment-grade issuance de-
clined from 16 percent in 1990 to about 10 per-
cent in 1991 and 1992, and 6 percent in 1993.
Note also that the share of below-investment-
grade issuance continued to fall through 1995. 
I will return to the persistent nature of the
crunch later.
Second, according to survey data from the
American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI), the
share of total commitments by life insurers to
below-investment-grade private placements
dropped sharply in mid-1990, from 21 percent
in the first half of the year to 11 percent in the
second half (Figure 2). Since then, this share
has never risen above 7 percent. While data 
are unavailable on a continuous basis before
1990, Shapiro (1977) reports that the average
annual share of commitments going to below-
investment-grade bonds between 1960 and 1975
was 19.9 percent. In other words, starting in
mid-1990, there was a historically unprece-
dented shift in insurers’ investments away from
below-investment-grade private bonds.
Consistent with the reduced rate of pur-
chase of below-investment-grade bonds, life
insurance companies’ holdings of these securi-
ties fell 11 percent in 1991, whereas holdings of
investment-grade securities rose by nearly 12
percent. As a result, as shown in Table 3, below-
investment-grade private bonds as a percentage
of all private placements in insurance company
portfolios declined from 19.8 percent in 1990 
to 12 percent in 1993 (and to 10 percent by
year-end 1995). As private bonds are infre-
quently sold in the secondary market, this sharp
decline in outstandings is consistent with an
abrupt cessation of new investments in below-
investment-grade private bonds. Life insurance
companies appear to have simply let their port-
folios of such bonds run off without replacing
them. Table 3 illustrates that this aversion also
Table 3
Life Insurance Industry Below-Investment-Grade Bond Investments
(Percentage of bonds held that are below investment grade)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Private placements 19.8 16.5 15.3 12.0 11.4 10.0
Public bonds 6.8 4.7 3.7 3.8 6.1 8.4
Total bonds 10.3 7.7 6.5 5.7 8.1 9.0
SOURCE: National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
Figure 2
New Commitments to Purchase 
Below-Investment-Grade Private Placements,
As a Percentage of Total Commitments by
Life Insurance Companies, 1990–96
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extended to the public market in the early
1990s—holdings of below-investment-grade
public bonds as a share of total public bonds
fell from 6.8 percent in 1990 to 3.7 percent 
in 1992.
14
Accompanying the decline in issuance and
outstandings was a sharp increase in yield
spreads on below-investment-grade private
bonds. According to market reports, before
1990 the difference in yields on BB- and BBB-
rated private bonds with comparable terms was
about 100 basis points; since then, the differ-
ence has been as high as 250 basis points.
15
Although data are unavailable before 1990, the
spreads reported in the ACLI survey confirm 
this movement (Figures 3 and 4).
16 During the
first half of 1990, the spread between yields on
BB-rated private placements and comparable
Treasury securities was just over 300 basis
points, compared with just over 200 basis points
for BBB-rated privates. This implies a difference
in yields between BB- and BBB-rated bonds of
about 100 basis points, consistent with market
reports of the “normal” spread between such
bonds at the end of the 1980s. During 1991–93,
however, the spread over Treasuries on BB-
rated privates rose sharply to around 350 basis
points (peaking at 425 basis points in early
1991), while the spread over Treasuries on 
BBB-rated privates actually fell somewhat.
17
The yield spread between BBB- and BB-rated
bonds thus rose to between 130 and 220 basis
points over this period. Note again that spreads
between BB- and BBB-rated private bonds re-
mained between 180 and 200 basis points
through 1995 and 1996.
Of course, one could argue that the
increase in spreads over Treasuries for BB-rated
private bonds in late 1990 and 1991 largely
resulted from the slowdown in economic 
activity. The recession could have increased
borrower riskiness, and life insurers could have
demanded higher interest rates in response.
However, such an argument does not account
for the fact that spreads over Treasuries on
investment-grade private bonds actually de-
clined in the recession, as shown in Figure 3.
This pattern of behavior is not observed in 
the previous recession, when spreads over
Treasuries of investment-grade bonds rose, and
in fact rose by a greater amount than spreads on
below-investment-grade bonds.
18 This argument
would also fail to account for the continuing
high spreads on BB-rated securities during the
expansion that followed the 1990–91 recession.
Overall, it appears more likely that, within the
below-investment-grade sector of the private
placement market, for a given level of risk, loan
prices went up, whereas the volume of loans
went down. These facts are consistent with a
credit crunch in this market.
Mechanisms behind the credit crunch
The mechanism behind the credit crunch
in the private placement market is somewhat
different from those that have been proposed in
the research literature. This section briefly
reviews the literature on credit crunches and
contrasts it with the mechanism that I argue is
behind the recent credit crunch in the private
placement market.
One branch of the literature on credit
crunches focuses on reductions in intermedi-
aries’ lending activity caused by regulatory
Figure 3
















1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990
NOTE: Spreads are quarterly-weighted average spreads over the
7-year Treasury bond.
SOURCE: American Council of Life Insurance.
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actions that affect lenders’ ability or incentives
to assume certain risks. For example, Bernanke
and Lown (1991), Clair and Tucker (1993),
Berger and Udell (1994), Peek and Rosengren
(1995), and Brinkman and Horvitz (1995) exam-
ine the effect of overzealous bank examination
and the imposition of risk-based capital require-
ments on banks as a reason for the slowing of
bank lending in the early 1990s. Banks facing
binding capital constraints as a result of large
loan losses, low earnings, and the introduction
of higher regulatory requirements for capital
levels had three options for increasing their 
capital–asset ratios: raise new capital, shrink
assets and thereby liabilities, or change the mix
of assets to include more government securities
and fewer loans to businesses.
19 The latter two
choices involve cutting back lending to borrow-
ers. More aggressive examination practices that
forced banks to make excessive charges against
capital and accept new credit risks more cau-
tiously would have a similar effect.
Another branch of the literature focuses
on a decline in indebted firms’ net worth and
the value of their unencumbered collateral as a
reason for a contraction in financial intermedi-
ary lending. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) sug-
gest that borrowers’ net worth can affect
lending activity by financial intermediaries. As
borrower net worth declines, then the agency
costs of external finance rise. Thus lenders will
be increasingly unwilling to lend to firms as
their net worth declines. Shocks that impact 
firm net worth negatively can thus produce
credit crunches.
20
A third branch of the literature focuses on
contractions of lending by intermediaries
caused by liquidity problems, as modeled by
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In their model, a
bank transforms illiquid assets into liquid
deposits. Although bank assets are riskless,
there is a cost to turning them liquid. Thus a
bank run can still occur if depositors conjecture
that all other depositors will withdraw their
deposits early and consequently run to the bank
to close their accounts before the bank exhausts
its assets. Since the bank’s assets are riskless,
however, runs are not caused by rumors about
the bank’s solvency. Instead, runs arise as a ran-
dom phenomenon, like sunspots. However it is
caused, the effect of a run is the same—the
bank must liquidate its illiquid loans and con-
tract lending activity.
A final branch of the literature focuses on
contractions in intermediaries’ lending caused
by runs due to liabilityholder concerns about
financial intermediaries’ solvency. Chari and
Jagannathan (1988) and Gorton and Calomiris
(1991) model situations where bank assets are
risky. Some depositors have private information
about the value of the bank’s assets, while 
others try to infer this information from the
number of depositors who line up at the with-
drawal window. If there is a long line, these
depositors will (sometimes incorrectly) infer bad
news about the value of the bank’s assets and
this will trigger a bank run, which in turn trig-
gers a sharp contraction in bank lending.
As I argue in the next section, the mecha-
nism behind the credit crunch in the private
placement market was largely unrelated to the
liquidity-based models of runs and was not
associated with a decline of indebted firms’ net
worth or regulatory action.
21 It was most closely
related to the last class of models, which
focuses on runs caused by liabilityholder con-
cerns about financial intermediaries’ solvency.
However, unlike in these models, no actual runs
occurred to trigger a flight to quality by an
insurance company: the mere threat that poten-
tial customers were focusing on an insurer’s
below-investment-grade bond holdings was
enough to trigger a withdrawal from the market
for these securities. Thus, the signal to liability-
holders provided by the length of the line at the
withdrawal window was not crucial, because
most life insurers did not experience runs. What
was crucial was the perception that the share of
below-investment-grade bonds on the insurer’s
books was impeding the ability to sell life insur-
ance policies to potential customers and hurting
the firm’s stock price. The next section reviews
the flight-to-quality mechanism behind the
credit crunch.
The flight-to-quality mechanism in the 
private placement market
22
Until the early 1990s, the life insurance
industry had enjoyed a long-standing reputation
for financial stability. In 1990, however, con-
cerns arose about the financial state of some 
life insurers when two insurance companies
announced large write-downs of their bond and
commercial real estate portfolios.
23 In 1991, five
life insurance companies were seized by regula-
tors.
24 Of these, two had large exposures to
below-investment-grade bonds, and one had
heavy exposures to commercial real estate.
In 1991, life insurers also became subject
to more rigorous disclosure requirements with
regard to their below-investment-grade hold-
ings. In 1990, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) revised its 
system of rating bonds held by life insurance20
companies to more closely resemble those of
the major credit rating agencies. As shown in
Table 4, under the old rating system, bonds that
would have been rated below-investment-grade
by the major ratings services—BB or below—
were often rated investment grade (a “Yes” 
rating) by the NAIC for regulatory purposes. A
“Yes” rating under the old system could be
given to securities rated from AAA to B, while a
“No*,” “No**,” or “No” rating could be given to
securities rated from BB to those in default.
Under the new system, all bonds rated below-
investment-grade by the major ratings agencies
were rated below-investment-grade by the
NAIC. NAIC-1, the top rating, was given to 
securities rated AAA to A, NAIC-2 to BBB securi-
ties, NAIC-3 to BB securities, and NAIC-4 to B
securities.
The first balance sheet data (from 1990)
incorporating the new ratings were released in
spring 1991. Although life insurance company
investments in below-investment-grade bonds
had changed little from 1989, the new system
made it look as if there had been a huge jump
in life insurance company exposure to below-
investment-grade bonds. From 1989 to 1990,
reported below-investment-grade holdings of
the life insurance industry rose 40 percent and,
as a share of all corporate bond holdings,
increased from 15 to 21 percent. The sudden
appearance of larger below-investment-grade
holdings by life insurance companies focused
the attention of regulators, stock investors, the
media, advisors to the institutional buyers of 
life insurance products, and policyholders 
themselves on the composition of insurers’
bond holdings. Below-investment-grade bonds
became a source of concern for these con-
stituencies, with the ultimate result that insur-
ance companies ceased investing in them.
Fenn and Cole (1994) document that stock
prices of insurance companies with higher than
average concentrations of junk bonds were ad-
versely affected by the publicity surrounding
First Executive’s write-down of its bond port-
folio in early 1990.25 In contrast, stock prices of
insurance companies with lower than average
exposure to below-investment-grade bonds were
not affected.
The media also reacted unfavorably to
those insurers with large holdings of below-
investment-grade bonds. DeAngelo et al. (1994)
suggest that First Executive—whose financial
problems stemmed from overexposure to below-
investment-grade bonds—received much more
press coverage than other large life insurers
with serious financial problems stemming from
other reasons at the same time. They report that
from July 1989 to April 1991, thirty-two feature
articles on First Executive appeared in four
major newspapers. Over the same period, there
were only seven feature articles on any of the
industry’s top ten companies, despite the fact
that, during this period, other life insurers suf-
fered substantial financial problems unrelated to
their below-investment-grade bond investments.
Finally, potential customers of life insur-
ance companies became sensitive to the share
of below-investment-grade bonds held by insur-
ers. Fenn (1995) finds evidence indicating that
life insurance companies’ asset growth from
1990 to 1993 was extremely sensitive to their
below-investment-grade holdings. Consistent with
this finding, life insurance companies began to
market themselves to policyholders on the basis
of their below-investment-grade bond holdings.
Insurers began to advertise explicitly their low
exposure to below-investment-grade bonds in
print and television media (see Lublin 1990).
Of course, much of this activity would
have been warranted had below-investment-
grade bonds truly been a serious problem for
the life insurance industry. However, Fenn
(1995) suggests they were not and that the use
of below-investment-grade bond holdings as 
a signal of insurance company solvency prob-
lems was probably not warranted. First, below-
investment-grade bonds were actually only a
small factor in life insurers’ asset quality prob-
lems: none of the largest twenty life insurance
companies had more than 10 percent of their
general account assets in the form of below-
investment-grade bonds. Far more serious was
the industry’s sizable exposure to commercial
real estate: in 1990, only two of the twenty
Table 4
NAIC Ratings
NAIC rating designation Equivalent rating-agency
designation
Old system
Yes AAA to B
No* BB, B
No** CCC or lower
No In or near default
New system




5 CCC or lower
6 In or near default
SOURCE: Securities Valuation Office, National Association of Insurance Commissioners.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       21 ECONOMIC REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1997
largest life insurers had less than 15 percent of
their general account assets tied up in commer-
cial real estate. In 1990, the largest twenty life
insurance companies together held 31 percent
of their general account assets in real estate,
versus under 6 percent in (public and private)
below-investment-grade bonds.
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Second, the slump in the commercial real
estate market was longer and deeper than in the
below-investment-grade market. Fenn (1995)
reports that commercial real estate prices fell 
24 percent between 1990 and 1992. In some
regions of the country, prices fell by consider-
ably more. In contrast, Fenn reports that public
below-investment-grade bond prices fell 9 per-
cent from 1989 to 1990 and then recovered
sharply in 1991 and 1992. No data are available
on prices in the private bond market because
these bonds are rarely traded on the secondary
market, but there is little evidence that default
rates increased sharply in this period for private
placement below-investment-grade issuers.
Regardless of whether the share of below-
investment-grade bonds on an insurer’s books
was an accurate signal of its financial condition,
there is evidence that the media, the stock mar-
ket, and life insurance companies anticipated
(correctly) that policyholders would be espe-
cially sensitive to this signal. The result was an
almost complete withdrawal by life insurers
from the below-investment-grade sector of the
private placement market in 1991 and 1992.
Reasons for the persistence of the crunch.
One surprising aspect of the credit crunch is its
persistence. Data on issuance and yield spreads
in Tables 2 and 3 and Figures 2, 3, and 4 sug-
gest that the credit crunch in the private market
is an ongoing phenomenon six years after it
started. This is in stark contrast to the public
bond and bank loan markets, which revived as
long ago as 1993 and are now very active mar-
kets for firms seeking funds. Why has the private
placement market been special in this regard?
It is unlikely that insurance companies still
feel the need to advertise low below-invest-
ment-grade bond exposure. Possibly this was
true as late as 1993, but it is hard to believe that
it is still the case. Concerns about life insurance
company financial stability appear to have dis-
appeared: the financial condition of the industry
has improved significantly since 1992, and 
capital–asset ratios for the industry are at their
highest level in almost a quarter of a century. In
any case, life insurers appear no longer averse
to investing in below-investment-grade public
bonds. As illustrated in Table 4, over the last
three years, insurance companies have in-
creased the share of their public bond invest-
ments going to below-investment-grade issues.
At year-end 1995, the industry’s 8.4 percent
share was higher than it had been in 1990.
One reason may lie in the influence of
risk-based capital standards, which became
effective at the end of 1993 and which may have
reinforced the reluctance of insurance compa-
nies to buy below-investment-grade securities.
The new standards are aimed at measuring the
prudential adequacy of insurers’ capital as a
means of distinguishing between weakly and
strongly capitalized companies. To this end,
insurers must report the ratios of their book
capital to levels of capital that are adjusted for
risk. As an insurer’s ratio falls progressively
below one, successively stronger regulatory
actions are triggered. One way insurers can
raise their risk-based capital ratios is to shift into
lower risk assets, and below-investment-grade
securities carry risk-weights much higher than
those on investment-grade bonds and even
commercial mortgages. While the introduc-
tion of risk-based capital standards may in 
part explain insurers’ continued reluctance to
invest in below-investment-grade private bonds,
it is unlikely to be the whole story, since in-
surers have returned to the public below-
investment-grade market, and the capital 
standards do not discriminate between private
and public bonds.
The change in the composition of life
insurers’ assets between those held in general
accounts and separate accounts may partly
explain insurers’ investment behavior. Insurers’
separate account assets are held apart from their
general account assets. All gains and losses of a
separate account are directly attributed to the
policyholders of that account. Separate account
assets have grown much faster than general
account assets since the early 1990s, when con-
cern about insurers’ financial stability first
arose.
27 However, the shift from general to 
separate account products may have impeded
the industry’s traditional lending activities, since
separate account assets must be marked-to-
market and therefore consist primarily of liquid
assets such as public bonds and publicly traded
equities. Public below-investment-grade bonds
are considered significantly more liquid than
private below-investment-grade bonds and 
are thus more suitable assets for separate
accounts.
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It is possible that the recent proliferation
of below-investment-grade public bond inves-
tors has “cherry-picked” the better credits from
the private market, thereby substantiating the22
need for permanently higher spreads in the pri-
vate market. However, as discussed above, the
public and private bond markets are very dif-
ferent debt markets, and for many firms there is
a limited scope for switching between them.
Thus, this is unlikely to be the whole story for
the persistence of high spreads and low insurer
interest in this market.
A final reason has to do with the infor-
mation-intensive nature of the private market
for below-investment-grade issues and the 
high start-up costs facing many insurers that
might consider getting back into the below-
investment-grade sector of the private market.
At the height of the credit crunch in 1991 
and 1992, many life insurance companies 
scaled back substantially on their credit staffs,
which are necessary for investing in the most
information-problematic private bonds in the
below-investment-grade sector. Many insurance
companies may now be reluctant to incur the
start-up costs associated with expanding their
risk-control resources, particularly if they feel
there is some likelihood of the same policy-
holder focus on below-investment-grade bond




The credit crunch in the private placement
market is an example of a flight-to-quality
mechanism at work. Private placements are
information-intensive securities that require sub-
stantial due diligence and monitoring by inter-
mediaries in order to ascertain their value. They
make up a substantial portion of life insurance
company assets; these companies are therefore
vulnerable to the flight-to-quality mechanism
because, unlike banks, their liabilities are not
insured. Financial problems at life insurance
companies, a change in regulatory reporting
requirements, and runs on a few insurers com-
bined to raise doubts about the solvency of life
insurance companies and focused regulatory,
media, stock market, and public attention on
the share of life insurance company assets in
below-investment-grade bonds as a signal of
solvency. Life insurance companies, therefore,
began to compete with each other on the basis
of this share. This created a large-scale with-
drawal from the market for below-investment-
grade bonds, creating a credit crunch in this
segment of the private placement market.
Ironically, it is likely that the share of below-
investment-grade bonds on an insurer’s books
was not a very good signal of its solvency. But
the information-intensive nature of the securi-
ties meant that outsiders could be misled in 
this regard.
The existence of a mechanism that could
induce the credit crunch in the private place-
ment market does have some more general
implications. Flights to quality by U.S. commer-
cial banks have been rare since the advent of
deposit insurance. However, this might change
if recent proposals for “narrow” banks are
enacted. Under these proposals, banks would
be split into two parts: a narrow bank that
would be fully insured, provide payments 
system services, and invest only in Treasury
securities; and a “broad” bank that would raise
uninsured funds in the open market and invest
in traditional bank loans. Although the pay-
ments system would be fully insured under 
this system, broad banks might be an un-
stable source of funds for firms as they would
be subject to the kind of flight-to-quality mecha-
nism I’ve described for life insurance com-
panies. A fuller understanding of the role of
deposit insurance in promoting stable financial
intermediation is necessary before the welfare
effects of narrow bank proposals can be 
fully analyzed.
Notes
I thank Mark Carey and George Fenn for helpful dis-
cussions, and Ken Robinson and Harvey Rosenblum
for comments on an earlier draft.
1 “Information-intensive” refers to the requirement that
due diligence be performed by the lender at the time
of loan origination and monitoring be done thereafter.
“Information-problematic” borrowers are those that
pose particularly severe information problems to
lenders, which must consequently engage in costly
due diligence and monitoring to evaluate and control
the credit risk of the borrower.
2 Although I focus on the traditional market, the Rule
144A market has become quite significant, totaling
almost 50 percent of gross issuance in 1995.
3 Of course, this implies that in terms of net new funds
raised, the private market is even more important than
the gross issuance numbers suggest.
4 Outstandings of public bonds are the sum of bonds
rated by Moody’s Investors Service and publicly
issued medium-term notes. Private placements are
estimated by subtracting the figure for public bonds
from outstandings of all corporate bonds reported in
the Flow of Funds accounts. Data for bank loans are
from the Flow of Funds accounts.
5 Further, bank loans tend to have maintenance cove-
nants, whereby the criteria set forth in the covenant
must be met on a continuous basis (at the end of 
each quarter, for example), whereas private bonds
tend to have incurrence covenants, whereby the FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       23 ECONOMIC REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1997
criteria must be met at the time of a prespecified
event, such as an acquisition or the issuance of 
new debt. See Carey et al. (1993).
6 Kwan and Carleton (1996) report that over half of a
sample of private placements were renegotiated at
least once, with most of the renegotiations occurring
for loans in good standing.
7 See American Council of Life Insurance (1996).
8 This reflects both the general concentration of the life
insurance industry—the twenty largest life insurers
hold about 50 percent of total industry assets—and
the fact that large lenders have an advantage in
investing in private placements because their large
investment volume allows them to participate con-
tinuously in the market, giving them up-to-date infor-
mation on pricing.
9 See also Carey et al. (1993) for a discussion of this
phenomenon.
10 This also contributed to a crunch in the public below-
investment-grade market, where life insurance com-
panies were also significant lenders (but not nearly 
so dominant as they were in the private market).
11 This definition is similar to that of Bernanke and Lown
(1991), who in their analysis of the credit crunch in the
bank loan market in the early 1990s define a crunch
as “a significant leftward shift in the supply of bank
loans holding constant both the safe real interest rate
and the quality of potential borrowers.”
12 The decline of issuance may or may not have been
achieved by nonprice rationing: I have no quantitative
evidence either way. Interviews with market partici-
pants on this topic revealed mixed views.
13 Gross issuance excludes offerings to finance employee
stock ownership plans and restructurings. Underlying
developments are more evident with their exclusion, 
as both were heavy in 1989 but fell off sharply in 1990
and 1991. Also excluded are Rule 144A offerings.
Before 1990, ratings reflected the judgment of agents
supplying information on the transactions they
assisted. Thereafter, ratings assigned by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners are used.
14 Note, however, that unlike in the private market, life
insurance companies appear to have returned to 
buying below-investment-grade public bonds in 
recent years.
15 See Carey et al. (1993). BBB-rated bonds are the low-
est investment-grade rating category, while BB-rated
bonds are the highest below-investment-grade rating
category.
16 Care must be used in comparing the reported
spreads. Although they are transaction prices, they 
do not reflect a standardized security. As noted in the
first section of the article, the nonprice terms of private
placements can differ widely for bonds carrying the
same credit rating, and the terms affect the yields. 
For example, at any given moment, the difference in
spreads between the highest-risk BB-rated issue and
the lowest-risk BB-rated issue may be as much as 150
basis points. Under normal circumstances, averaging
spreads within a rating category produces a represen-
tative spread for the rating. However, as most of the
BB-rated bonds issued since mid-1990 probably were
at the least-risky end of the BB risk range, the increase
in the BB spread shown in Figures 3 and 4 probably
understates the actual increase.
17 Similarly, the spread on A-rated private bonds also
declined during 1991–93.
18 In the 1981–82 recession, spreads over the 7-year
Treasury on A- and BBB-rated bonds rose by 60 and
52 basis points, respectively, over their level for the
twelve months prior to the recession, while those on
BB-rated bonds rose by 45 basis points. These
spreads are for public bonds; data for private bonds
are unavailable.
19 Risk-based capital may be viewed as a regulatory 
tax that is higher on assets with higher risk-weights,
encouraging substitution out of assets in the 100 
percent risk category—such as commercial loans—
and into assets in the zero risk category—such as
Treasury securities.
20 In this case, the phenomenon would not qualify as a
credit crunch as I have defined it, since the risk of the
borrower presumably increases as net worth declines.
21 However, regulators were probably at least partly
responsible for the flight to quality to the extent they
promulgated bad news to the public about below-
investment-grade bonds.
22 Much of the information in this section is from Fenn
(1995).
23 First Executive wrote down its bond portfolio by $515
million in January; in October, Travelers reserved $650
million for anticipated commercial real estate losses.
24 The five were Executive Life and Executive Life of New
York (both insurance subsidiaries of First Executive),
First Capital and Fidelity Bankers (insurance subsidi-
aries of First Capital Corp.), and Mutual Benefit.
25 Although they document that insurance company stock
prices also fell in response to Travelers’ announcement
of $650 million in commercial real estate losses, the
price declines were only about one-quarter the size
(per unit of investment in below-investment-grade
bonds or commercial real estate).
26 Rating agencies downgraded more than half of rated
life insurance companies in 1991 and 1992, mostly for
reasons of commercial real estate exposure.
27 This is primarily because separate account policy-
holders have a preferred claim on separate account
assets and are therefore afforded greater protection 
if an insurer defaults.
28 This of course has implications for how banks might
behave if forced to implement market-value account-
ing for their assets. In such circumstances, illiquid
commercial loans would be viewed as more costly 
relative to liquid Treasury securities.24
29 The fact that other potential investors in below-invest-
ment-grade private placements—such as pension
funds and finance companies—have not dramatically
expanded their role as lenders to take advantage of
the high spreads is evidence that there are likely to 
be high start-up costs to entering this market.
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